Iran-U.S.-Challenges of Entering Direct Talks

Despite the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 against Iran and the direct role of the Obama administration in passing fresh multilateral and unilateral sanctions against Iran, the potential for direct negotiations between the two parties remains. In recent months, the stern and reproachful rhetoric normally reserved for both sides has been toned down and one can even notice positive signals emanating from both Tehran and Washington. The latest was perhaps President Ahmadinejad’s readiness to have a debate (read negotiations) with President Obama proposed during the Convention of Iranian Expatriates held in Tehran two weeks ago. President Obama also employed a cautious tone in referring to negotiations with Iran.

The driving force for direct talks is first and foremost based on ‘mutual strategic needs’. For Washington, bilateral negotiations will remove Iran from the list of hostile Middle Eastern states. Such a move could have a constructive impact on overcoming regional crises, namely the Middle East Peace Process, and the unpromising prospects currently in evidence inside Iraq and Afghanistan. Progress on this front would prove crucial during the period in which president Obama plans to withdraw American troops from Iraq in two phases, at the end of this year and the summer of 2011, and in light of the Taliban’s resurgence and failure to fade from the scene in Afghanistan.  In terms of the regional balance, bilateral talks with Iran could also help Washington address Iran’s role and influence in the region, particularly regarding its nuclear program, often regarded as the most serious challenge faced by Obama’s foreign policy. The success of any such effort, would allow the United States to preserve the regional status quo, while making adequate room for Iran to share in the burden and dividends of maintaining the latter.

Such a strategic need is also motivation enough for Iran to start direct talks. If removed from the U.S. list of bogeymen, Iran could focus its energy on development and economic issues, thus far sacrificed for the sake of political and security challenges, despite receiving broad support from the wider public. Meanwhile, Iran could continue uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes on its own soil. Ultimately, Iran could convince the Americans to accept its regional role through a cooperative win-win game, based on a balance of security between the two sides. In the event of such a development, Iran could even preserve its independent political-security strategies and maintain its coalition with friendly political factions and states i.e. Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi Shi’ite factions and Syria in the region. It’s fair to say that Iran and the U.S. have for the most part tacitly embraced the potential scenarios detailed above.

Yet, direct strategic talks do not necessarily mean renewed friendship between Tehran and Washington; rather they imply the persuasion of each side to acknowledge the other’s role and to reach a compromise on the issue of cohabitation in a region where both have vital national and security interests. Both sides would conclude that continuing in a permanent condition of mutual hostility can only inflict greater damage to their national interests. This would entail an exit from the current state of confrontation to interaction or constructive rivalry, in order to maintain their regional interests. For instance, direct talks between the United States and communist China in 1972 did not result in a friendship.

At the same time, the “conditions” could be said to be ideal for starting direct talks. Normally, strategic negotiations take place when: 1) Neither side is able to eliminate or marginalize its rival’s role in regional affairs. 2) The opposing actors have independent foreign policies and national security strategies which have a role in shaping their adversary’s political-security coalitions.  3) A kind of ‘political parity’ at the negotiating level is established between the two parties regarding one or more strategic issue.  4) There is relative political consensus between the ruling elite over a key national strategic issue to initiate direct talks.  5) Both sides are shifting from the confrontation phase to the constructive interaction and rivalry phase and wish to embark on a win-win game aimed at acquiring a mutually satisfactory state of affairs.

All the above-mentioned elements currently govern the present state of Iran-U.S.-relations. First, neither side can marginalize the role of the other in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon or Palestine. Second, each follows an independent national security strategy in the Persian Gulf and Middle East and is capable of forging political-security and ideological coalitions against its rival. Iran spearheads a coalition including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Shi’ite factions of Iraq, along with its tight-knit relationship  with Syria, while the U.S. leads a bloc consisting of conservative Arab states and Israel. Third, Iran’s nuclear program has established a sort of ‘political parity’ for future negotiations. The process of nuclear talks which started in conjunction with the nuclear crisis in 2002 and efforts by both parties to continue negotiations by offering different proposal packages hold as clear proof that this is the case. Fourth, as a national and strategic issue on the Iranian side and a so-called strategic challenge for U.S. national security and interests, Iran’s nuclear program enjoys relative political consensus among the ruling elite of both sides and has therefore created a sense of necessity for starting direct talks. Finally, the sensitivity and nature of Iran’s nuclear program inevitably directs both parties towards interaction and a win-win game. Washington and Tehran must choose between interaction or war. Evidences indicate that both parties prefer interaction, though they want to rely on their own tried and tested tactics. The United States imposes fresh sanctions to compel negotiations and to maintain the upper hand and Iran continues to stand by its solid nuclear policy so as to engage in direct talks with the upper hand.

Believing in the other side’s sincere intentions is a basic condition for entering direct strategic talks. When it comes to Tehran and Washington’s relations, the mistrust and unfamiliarity of both sides with the decision-making process of the other is the primary reason for skepticism. For Iran, it is not yet clear if Obama is sincere in changing the U.S. policy of confrontation towards Iran. Thus, the ruling elite in Iran continue to insist that Washington cannot make the aim of engagement in direct talks one of undermining the Islamic Republic from within and isolating Iran internationally, under the influence of the anti-Iran elements in the U.S. and Israeli lobbies.

On the other hand, the Americans are uncertain about Iran’s real intentions and worry about direct talk’s chances for success. Iran’s refusal to continue negotiations on the issue of uranium swap after holding talks in Geneva and Vienna in October 2009 serves as compelling evidence. The failure of such talks could have negative consequences for any American president. Politicians in Washington still have not forgotten the bitter memory of the Iran-Contra scandal and the unfruitful attempts to directly negotiate with Iran. President Obama’s correspondence with the Iranian leadership just before Iran’s presidential election last June is another case in point, even though as it turned out the letter was sent to the wrong address.

To break the present impasse, both sides should employ leverage which reduces the political risks of engagement in direct talks and moves away from the perception of threat or possible loss in direct engagement. The upcoming nuclear talks between Iran and the 5+1 in September could act as a good starting point. With its independent enrichment fuel cycle, Iran may be said to possess the upper hand and it should not fear the possibility of failing to reap benefits in the course of talks. Iran should therefore assure the United States about its serious intentions in continuing talks and in its willingness to pursue the latter to an acceptable point. This, of course, calls for full support by all political tendencies and political factions inside Iran to engage in the direct talks. In this respect, it is to the benefit of Iran to manage the talks at the level of states and based on open diplomacy and reporting to the public.

President Obama should also take the political risk of engaging in direct talks with Iran. At the first stage, this process should start with the persuasion of political factions inside the United States and encouraging them to change their perception regarding the aims and ambitions of Iran’s nuclear program. A key step would be differentiating  between the themes of nuclear energy and the issue of weaponization. Moreover, connecting Iran’s nuclear program to issues of deterrence must be stopped. These are important steps toward confidence-building and alleviate the perception of an Iranian nuclear threat among the American public and in Congress.

Although many issues of common concern are shared by Iran and the United States, including a wide range of political-security issues, it is only Iran’s nuclear program which has the potential for giving an impetus to direct talks. The first serious step, however, is that the decision-makers in the two countries are assured of each other’s sincere desire to engage in direct talks and thereby achieve a resolution after years of mutual antagonism and obstruction. Kayhan Barzegar is a faculty member at Science and Research Campus, Islamic Azad University and the Director of International Affairs at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran.