The Stumbling Block to Tehran-Cairo Friendship
By Seyyed Abdul-Amir Nabavi, senior researcher in Middle East Strategic Research Center
Two Middle Eastern countries with remarkable commonalities: both have thousands-years-old civilizations, both are located in geopolitically and geoeconomically important regions and both have suffered religious extremism. However, during the past three decades differences, regional developments and international circumstances –and not these commonalities- have determined the course of Tehran-Cairo relations that sometimes border on crisis.
The relations started going downhill in late 1970s, when Anwar Sadat infuriated revolutionaries in Iran by signing the Camp David Accords with Israel and adding insult to injury, hosted the fleeing Iranian monarch Mohammad Reza Pahlavi a few months later. A period of tension caused Iran to cut off ties in 1979, though Egypt had laid the groundwork by instigating a split and accusing the new regime of Tehran with meddling in Arab countries’ affairs. Under the surface, Egypt was trying to make up for its isolation and expulsion from the Arab League via demonizing Iran in the eyes of the Arab public opinion.
Iraq’s invasion of Iranian territories in September 1980 which sparked off an all-out war gave Egypt the best opportunity to reclaim its leading role in the Arab World. Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981 had already drifted Iran and Egypt apart as much as possible. While the incident was plotted by Egyptian Islamists in response to Sadat’s compromise with Israel, Egypt could not curb the urge to accuse the Iranian revolutionary ideology, and even the Iranian officials. With the ever-growing bitter atmosphere, Iraq also found the chance to receive Egyptians’ aid during the 8-year war.
Relations started to thaw in the late 1980s with Iran agreeing to release Egyptian captives who were at the service of the Iraqi military machine during the war. The world was changing at those days: Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and collapse of the Eastern Bloc had enormous ramifications for the regional and international order, giving Iran the opportunity to reconstruct its international relations. Through a détente policy, which started with Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency and gained momentum when Mohammed Khatami came to power, Iran initiated efforts to regain its natural position in Middle East. Now, it was no surprising news to hear about Iranian and Egyptian officials (though not at senior levels) to hold meetings and discuss issues of mutual interest. However, the level of ties did not budge as much as expected. Even expanding economic relations seemed of no help.
What is holding Tehran and Cairo from coming closer at the 21st century? The disagreements between two leading regional states are more often than not ascribed to Egypt’s cordial relations with the United States and Israel. While Iran defies West and slams Israel, Cairo has never stopped efforts to bring Arab countries to the table of negotiations with the Jewish state and undermine the resistance movement. During the 22-day raid of Israel on Gaza, Egypt blatantly sided with Israel and provoked the sentiments of the Arab street. The arrest of Sami Shahab, Hezbollah member in Egypt, and erection of a steel wall in Rafah crossing to cut Palestinians’ only lifeline to the outside the world- show Egypt’s determination in supporting compromise with Israel and undermining resistance. This is where the gap between Tehran and Cairo becomes the widest.
The basic, less observable obstacle lies in the policies of Egyptians, and not the Iranians. A closer look at the course of bilateral ties during the last two decades shows that the Arab state looks at Iran through a security glass. Iran’s post-war efforts to court Egypt were far from successful since the military and security echelons in Cairo have never decided to bring down the walls of suspicion. The Egyptian diplomatic apparatus doesn’t seem to be the key player on this issue.
As long as the security forces keep a tight rein on Egyptian diplomacy, an opening in bilateral ties remains unlikely: Cairo will continue to repeat its claims about Iran’s support for Egyptian and Palestinian Islamist groups, Sudan or religious extremists (a street in Tehran is named after Khaled Islambouli, the assassin of Anwar Sadat). Iran is worth negotiating only when it gives Egypt the chances to play their favorite role as balance-creators in Middle East.
The relations started going downhill in late 1970s, when Anwar Sadat infuriated revolutionaries in Iran by signing the Camp David Accords with Israel and adding insult to injury, hosted the fleeing Iranian monarch Mohammad Reza Pahlavi a few months later. A period of tension caused Iran to cut off ties in 1979, though Egypt had laid the groundwork by instigating a split and accusing the new regime of Tehran with meddling in Arab countries’ affairs. Under the surface, Egypt was trying to make up for its isolation and expulsion from the Arab League via demonizing Iran in the eyes of the Arab public opinion.
Iraq’s invasion of Iranian territories in September 1980 which sparked off an all-out war gave Egypt the best opportunity to reclaim its leading role in the Arab World. Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981 had already drifted Iran and Egypt apart as much as possible. While the incident was plotted by Egyptian Islamists in response to Sadat’s compromise with Israel, Egypt could not curb the urge to accuse the Iranian revolutionary ideology, and even the Iranian officials. With the ever-growing bitter atmosphere, Iraq also found the chance to receive Egyptians’ aid during the 8-year war.
Relations started to thaw in the late 1980s with Iran agreeing to release Egyptian captives who were at the service of the Iraqi military machine during the war. The world was changing at those days: Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and collapse of the Eastern Bloc had enormous ramifications for the regional and international order, giving Iran the opportunity to reconstruct its international relations. Through a détente policy, which started with Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency and gained momentum when Mohammed Khatami came to power, Iran initiated efforts to regain its natural position in Middle East. Now, it was no surprising news to hear about Iranian and Egyptian officials (though not at senior levels) to hold meetings and discuss issues of mutual interest. However, the level of ties did not budge as much as expected. Even expanding economic relations seemed of no help.
What is holding Tehran and Cairo from coming closer at the 21st century? The disagreements between two leading regional states are more often than not ascribed to Egypt’s cordial relations with the United States and Israel. While Iran defies West and slams Israel, Cairo has never stopped efforts to bring Arab countries to the table of negotiations with the Jewish state and undermine the resistance movement. During the 22-day raid of Israel on Gaza, Egypt blatantly sided with Israel and provoked the sentiments of the Arab street. The arrest of Sami Shahab, Hezbollah member in Egypt, and erection of a steel wall in Rafah crossing to cut Palestinians’ only lifeline to the outside the world- show Egypt’s determination in supporting compromise with Israel and undermining resistance. This is where the gap between Tehran and Cairo becomes the widest.
The basic, less observable obstacle lies in the policies of Egyptians, and not the Iranians. A closer look at the course of bilateral ties during the last two decades shows that the Arab state looks at Iran through a security glass. Iran’s post-war efforts to court Egypt were far from successful since the military and security echelons in Cairo have never decided to bring down the walls of suspicion. The Egyptian diplomatic apparatus doesn’t seem to be the key player on this issue.
As long as the security forces keep a tight rein on Egyptian diplomacy, an opening in bilateral ties remains unlikely: Cairo will continue to repeat its claims about Iran’s support for Egyptian and Palestinian Islamist groups, Sudan or religious extremists (a street in Tehran is named after Khaled Islambouli, the assassin of Anwar Sadat). Iran is worth negotiating only when it gives Egypt the chances to play their favorite role as balance-creators in Middle East.