Kremlin’s Charm and Our Caspian Rights

Amid all the post-election developments one short, but extremely important, news has been neglected. Russians have started a new game which implies that Iran’s share of Caspian resources should correspond to the length of its border with the sea. That is, Iran’s share from the world largest inland sea will be a mere 11 percent. It was such an assumption that got former Soviet republics to sit in Aktau and discuss regional cooperation and common concerns (which naturally revolve around Caspian Sea). Surprisingly, even offensively, Tehran was excluded. The gesture was so disturbing that it even provoked Manouchehr Mottaki, Ahmadinejad’s lethargic foreign minister. But who is to blame for this except the Ninth Administration? Forget about the fifty percent Caspian share asked for by some political and civil observers based on Iran-USSR agreements in the first half of the 20^th century; Ahmadinejad’s administration has shown that it does not even ask for one-fifth of the resources and is content with an 11 percent share. This was explicitly stated by Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki last year when he said: "…a fifty percent share for Iran is neither rational nor conventional…Iran’s exploitation of Caspian has never exceeded 11.3 percent". All the ensuing efforts to whitewash his remarks could never cover the real issue: Tehran’s bonds with Moscow have spoiled the chances to criticize Russia and demand national interests. Ignoring Iran sadly reveals that Tehran is increasingly turning into a marginal actor in Caspian affairs. What is glaringly missing is one of those outspoken statesmen to explain what the government understands from ’national interests’. What is diminishing in the Islamic Republic diplomats’ discourse is the necessity of joint use of Caspian basin’s oil and gas resources. What has come out from all the lengthy negotiations between Tehran and its Caspian neighbors (nearly thirty meetings at the level of foreign ministers and deputies, other talks at the ministerial level and two or three meetings at the highest executive level) is resignation to an 11.3 percent share and watching how other littoral states voraciously exploit resources of the world’s biggest lake. What Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan asked for is actually happening. The main portion of oil and gas resources lies near their maritime border so these countries believe that shares should be designated corresponding to the length of each country’s border with the lake. With this formula only 11.3 percent of the sea which lacks significant sub-basin resources remains in Iran’s possession. Given its shared historical background with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, Moscow has no serious concerns in Caspian. All sorts of economic partnerships are forged among these countries (including the oil and gas pipeline projects) and Russians’ interests are met. But what about Iranians’ interests? Who is concerned about that? Tehran-Moscow tradeoffs have emboldened Putin’s pals to take any sort of advantage, even if it is as humiliating as not inviting Iran to the Caspian littoral states’ conference. Moscow is well aware that Tehran’s need to its help, especially when Tehran’s nuclear case is put under spotlight, provides a chance for every request, however disrespectful it may be. During the Soviet era, Tehran and Moscow signed 1921 and 1940 treaties based on which in exploiting Caspian resources, they would have equal rights. After the Soviet empire collapse, Russia has actually settled down differences with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan over the maritime borders and sub-basin resources, leaving Iran alone with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to agree on their own share of the sea. Clearly what goes on in Caspian and its periphery does not have a legal face but rooted in power equation and relations between countries. It is from this departure point that Moscow is pursuing a fully pragmatic policy to achieve maximum interests, initiating a new ’game’ everyday. Russia has endorsed the division of Caspian surface and basin whenever it felt unable to stop the presence of extraregional actors, and called for a dual system (shared use of surface for navigation, and division of sub-basin resources) whenever it failed to reach agreement with other former Soviet republics. Ahmadinejad and his team just watch Moscow playing its game. On and off supportive pulses sent by Putinists has become so precious now that disrespect to ’trifling’ issues such as Iranians’ rights in Caspian causes no stir. Ahmadinejad’s need for Kremlin’s support is seriously challenging Iranians national interests. The events after the election show that no one feels the necessity to give a convincing ’response’ to citizens, even if it concerns our Caspian share.