Pakistan-America Relations, the Impact of Taliban Resurgence

The success of Pakistan’s efforts to help Taliban to reinstall its rule in Afghanistan may well be associated with a possible restructured policy of the United States and its western allies towards Islamabad. For long the U.S. lead coalition present and engaged in the so called “security provision and nation building missions in Afghanistan” had to accommodate Pakistan both as partner and claimant with no other option in sight. On the one hand, the coalition had to appease Islamabad in order to gain access to Pakistan’s overland supply routes and air corridors to manage its huge logistic requirements in the land-locked Afghanistan while on the other, had to face the ever-growing ability of Taliban insurgents to wage a non-conventional war of attrition patronized by Pakistan in terms of political backing and material supports. In doing so, Pakistan artfully increased security concerns for Washington by shoring up the Taliban and the Haqqani Network and extending them safe heavens in its territory. 

Pakistan’s leverage and influence on Taliban were also highly in demand for the success of the behind-the-scene talks aimed at reaching a political settlement of the Afghan conflict and departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. At this background and in February 2019 the Doha Peace Making Agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban was concluded. However, reluctance of Taliban to agree with a power sharing formula coupled with undeniable shortcomings and incompetence on the part of Ashraf Ghani administration hampered the full implementation of the understandings to the extent that only the scheduled full withdrawal of NATO forces was undertaken without any meaningful progress on the vital issue of formation of a broad based Afghan government. The hasty departure of U.S. troops, the unexpected quick meltdown of Afghan National Army and the horrifying scenes of desperate Afghans fleeing the country drew harsh and humiliating global criticisms on the ill-conduct of the U.S. administration. The fiasco was soon followed by expression of anger in the United States over the allegedly dubious role of Pakistan in its commitment to the “War on Terror”, and raised concerns about the nature of Washington’s relations with Islamabad. To this end, some U.S. lawmakers openly lay blame on Pakistan and clearly call for the revamp of America’s Pakistan policy and even initiation of punitive measures against Islamabad. In this context, and on 13th September 2021, the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken assured the Congress that; “ we’re going to be looking at the role that Pakistan has played over the last 20 years, also the role we would want to see it play in the coming years and what it will take for it to do that”. The gravity of situation was also felt in Pakistan as some notables and analysts while speaking of the dark days ahead of Pakistan’s relations with western countries in general, and with the U.S. in particular, warned the government to quickly rectify the course of its international engagements. Noteworthy is that Washington was not alone in accusing Pakistan of hosting the Taliban and other terrorists, thus subverting the efforts of the US-led coalition and Kabul administration. The government of Afghanistan had time and again accused Pakistan of being hand in glove with the Taliban and undermining the war against the latter.

 The post-cold war era and the dramatic events of the 1990’s, the departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and most notably, the disintegration of Soviet Union degraded the importance of Pakistan in the overall regional policy of America. Under the new circumstances and amid the bitter sense of being abandoned Pakistan was compelled to heed to the dictates of the day and to settle for a devalued level of interactions with Washington. In the absence of a meaningful strategic alliance, tactical approaches or conformity of interest on certain issue for limited period of time became the impetus for the otherwise less than normal level of Washington-Islamabad ties.

 In general terms, Pakistan and the U.S. rarely had fully overlapped policies and in most cases they experienced divergence of interests. Pakistan in its own capacity lacked permanent strategic value for the U.S., and its importance for Washington mainly derived from the significance Washington attaches to South Asia. Relations between the U.S. and Pakistan have had an on-and-off trajectory and from its beginning in the 1950s, have been established on an ad-hoc basis better known as transactional mode of relationship in which the United States has been seeking a security-oriented expectation and collaboration in exchange of military and economic assistances for Pakistan.  To this end, Washington needed Pakistan to better execute its designs vis-à-vis the Soviets in the 1980s and to eliminate Al-Qaeda in the 2000s, and for Pakistan, these apparently unwelcome circumstances created an opportunity to make its relevance felt and skillfully monetized. As such, once the security concerns fade away, the ties resets to a position where they hardly share a common interest that would bind them to cooperate further, rendering the give-and-take mode of relationship inevitable.

 Already concerned and preoccupied with the issue of deepening India-America relations, Pakistan has to also face the delicate challenge of staying afloat in the tide of China-U.S. rivalry. With the competition between the U.S. and China on the rise, Pakistan’s geopolitical location and close ties with China may work both as an asset and a liability. Probably Pakistan is hopeful that out of the concerns of Islamabad’s full integration into China’s sphere of influence, and in recognition of its regional security provision capabilities, Washington may lend more thought to at least, preserving bilateral relations at an appropriate level.

The United States may now has a free hand in readjusting the relationship with Pakistan as part of its broader interests in South Asia, which are geopolitical, regional, and security in nature.  Given the fact that most of U.S. dealings with Pakistan are confined to military and intelligence cooperation and also the deep involvement of Pakistan military and the civilian government alike in Afghanistan issue, it does not seem to be an easy decision for the United States to entirely abandon or fully engage Pakistan and its policy in the region. 

For Pakistan, in order to remain harm-free in the tussle between the U.S. and China, and also to at least maintain a lukewarm state of relations with Washington, it might be called upon to raise its contribution to peace efforts in region, help stabilize Afghanistan, enhance its economic potentials and to shift focus from geopolitics to geo-economics, as spelled out recently by its civilian and military leaders.