Fresh US’ Sanctions a Perilous Stroke for Nuke Deal

The new sanctions passed in the US Senate need approval in the House of Representatives. Do you think they will be passed easily?

Given the harsher stance in the House of Representatives against Iran, it does not seem that the bill would face a major obstacle. Of course, issues have been brought up recently that indicate the bill is inconsistent with parts of the Constitution and needs further investigation. If these could not block the legislation of the bill, Trump will naturally not want to obstruct the signature of the bill.

Given the annexation of the Russia sanctions, will the US president the bill?

Perhaps one of the motives behind the annexation of Russia sanctions was to test Trump’s will to impose sanctions on Russia. The Trump administration is motivated to approve the sanctions in order to purge itself of the accusations of collusion between Russia and the Trump campaign. Of course, what matters for Kremlin is the way the sanctions are implemented and the US administration has certain powers in doing so, that is to say, to refuse the implementation of some parts. The annexation of Russia sanction to Iran sanctions act unifies the two countries in issue related to the US and beyond that, affects the way they see other issues, particularly the ongoing differences in the region. It will also cause further conformity between Tehran and Moscow in the foreseeable future. Obviously, it will deteriorate the prospects for Iran and Russia relations with the US.

How effective do you think these sanctions are? Do you think Iran will focus on its problematic aspects and try to resist?

The most important part of the bill is the sanctions imposed against the IRGC, with ambiguous phrases open to interpretation, potentially seen as a big net in the hands of the US, giving it the power to make every suspicion of cooperation with IRGC a pretext for sanctions.

The bill tries to remain consistent with the paragraphs mentioned in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as much as possible. Nonetheless, it could be seen as a violation of Paragraph 29 in a legal battle. Additionally, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has said that any new sanctions is violation of the deal. Therefore, it is considered a breach from Iran’s side. However, if it is reviewed from a legal point of view, it should be referred to the JCPOA dispute resolution committee, which decides whether it is a violation or not.

Despite the many ambiguities of the bill, the intensity of the sanctions is not really serious. First, these are unilateral sanctions, which cannot affect Iran’s economic activities in the same way the multilateral sanctions did. From a political point of view, the legislation of the bill would increase distrust between the US and the P5+1 group, who worked as hard for the deal to be accomplished. The relatively tense relations between the US and the EU, increasing tensions with Russia, and China’s distrust regarding the Trump administration’s moves in the two countries’ bilateral ties have minimized the possibility for big powers to cooperate with the US. Therefore, these countries are more likely to have position more aligned with Iran’s than with the US. However, these sanctions are symbolically a great roll-back in Iran-US relations and could be seen as a perilous stroke for the nuclear deal.

The US is trying to uplift its role in the Middle East. How do the sanctions affect the process, given the role of Iran and the IRGC in the region?

It will have impacts in certain ways. Not on the logistic or supportive aspects of IRGC’s activities in the region but in that it could affect any future reconciliation in the region, as it further complicates the issues. It seem that the Americans are aware of this, and are intentionally moving in that direction. It could be inferred that the US does not welcome a straightforward agreement with Iran wherein Iran could maintain its dignity. In other words, an agreement with Iran where the IRGC is completely isolated and unrecognized is sought. In fact, the sanctions invest on a rift between the Iranian administration and the IRGC.

What message could IRGC’s targeting of Daesh have for the US?

The intended message was clear as it was officially declared to be merely a retaliation over the Daesh attacks. However, it could be interpreted differently in the future. If Iran’s diplomatic apparatus does not act well, this could be linked to the Qatar crisis or the Senate sanctions. If so, it could be seen as Iran’s saber-rattling, with negative consequences.

The move could be fruitful for Iran only if it is solely seen as a retaliation against Daesh and as Iran’s strike on Daesh, not IRGC’s. Drawing a line between IRGC’s measure and those measures as represented by the Rouhani administration pursues no other goal than to turn the IRGC into an official entity. Such an interpretation should never be recognized by fueling it in rhetoric.

Could the strike revitalize the peace process or will it cause negative consequences?

Missile strikes neither vitalize nor sabotage peace processes in themselves. It is the reactions that determine their outcome. The important thing is that they should not damage the peace talks in the region. How can we do so? To begin with, through repeating and elucidating that the missile strikes do not represent a new regional approach and that the strikes are not a beginning for future repetitions but they have been intended as a defensive measure against terrorist groups.

Otherwise, other countries may mistakenly think Iran is unilaterally using force, which could affect future peace talks. It is important to avoid rhetoric that may make others misunderstand Iran’s intensions. I think that we should focus on such issues domestically and describe the operation in the foreign policy domain at the same time to avoid being misunderstood.

In your opinion, if the new US sanctions are legislated, will this continue, leading to severer sanctions?

It depends on how the P5+1 countries respond to the US sanctions, and more so on what Russia does in response. If our measures and messages indicate a stance that the Islamic Republic would not tolerate any threat of violating or weakening the JCPOA, it could very much obstruct the repetition of similar sanctions. It seems that there is a readiness in Germany, the UK and France for such a response against the final legislation of the sanctions. In the meantime, we should also try to condemn such a unilateral gesture. Therefore, if they receive a firm response from us and the P5+1, it could be effective in terminating such measures.