How to Handle the Next US Administration

In the new Iranian year of 1395, a significant issue in international relations will be the coming to power of a new US administration. The change will be significant for Iran in that the next US administration’s approach to Iran (as a regional and international actor) and its attitude toward the JCPOA (as a multilateral international treaty) will also be different to some extent. The depth of the shift in approach will of course depend on the outcome of the presidential race in the United States. Whatever the results may be, it is a matter of prudence and foresight for the Iranian administration to get prepared for the worst scenario and provide for controlling potential damages induced by the next US administration from this very moment. In case the next US administration comes from an adverse anti-Iranian side, it will adopt two preliminary measures to weaken Iran’s international position and terminate the JCPOA:

1. Revival of the previous international consensus against Iran, trying to isolate Tehran in international relations
2. Revival of the ‘securitization’ project, exacerbating Iranophobia to ally public opinions for the cancellation of JCPOA

Thus, Tehran needs to nullify the two prerequisites of the next US administration by two separate measures; the solidification of its European ties alongside with strengthening of public diplomacy and efforts to resolve as many resolvable issues as possible with the US during the remaining months of President Obama’s tenure.

Solidification of European ties

Solidification of the ties between Europe and Iran in various areas of industry, technology, war on drugs, trade, and economy will bring about many benefits for both sides. In addition, establishing strong political, commercial and economic ties with European governments and private sectors alike will provide Iran with remarkable strategic achievements outlined below.

1. The solidification of such ties could guarantee the continuation of advantages given in the nuclear deal even if it is terminated unilaterally by the next US administration. In fact, Paragraph 14 of the Security Council Resolution 2231 establishes that contracts signed while the sanctions are lifted will be immune to snapbacks to a large extent. In other words, the snapback will not have ex post facto effects on such contracts. Thus, important areas such as energy, aerospace, communications, health, environment, agriculture, education, transportation to name a few included in contracts with the European side will be secure from a potential snapback of the sanctions which will tip the scales of power balance down in favor of Iran when the JCPOA is being implemented.
2. The solidification of such ties will make European governments to resist possible sabotage by the Congress or the next US president, working like a powerful lobby to support the continuation of the JCPOA and amicable relations with Iran. We observed an instance of such negotiations in the new visa waiver program adopted by the US. Additionally, the solidification of ties between Iran and Europe will persuade the European countries to use international legal mechanisms to control potential sabotage by the Congress or the next US administration in the implementation of the JCPOA. Let us not forget that in the mid-90’s and following the legislation of the so-called D’Amato-Kennedy bill in the Congress, some European countries litigated against the United States in the WTO court and then took political and diplomatic measures in Washington to prevent its implementation by the Clinton administration. The recurrence of such a scenario will be nothing impossible if the US ceases to cooperate when a new administration takes office.
3. With solidified relations between Iran and the European private sector, heavyweight and influential continental firms will negotiate and lobby with their governments and political factions to maintain their good relations and the détente atmosphere with Iran and prevent their disintegration under pressure from Washington. Put differently, by potential long-term contracts with European private sector giants and the consequent common interests as the firms will depend on Iran, Tehran will establish a civil, organic resistance against sanctions snapback and hostile policies regarding Iran in the heart of the EU.
4. Improvements in the relations between Iran and well-known European corporations will move rival American economic firms and companies toward protesting the fact that the US’ unilateral sanctions have remained intact. Complaints about US companies being fallen behind have already started seeing coverage in US media as some politicians and presidential nominees have shown unexpected responses. A man like Donald Trump, who has always called himself an ardent opponent of the nuclear deal, takes to media and social networks to express fury that French AirBus, not the American Boeing, has sold airplanes to Iran,. Naturally, continued or worsened, such objections could create a spontaneous resistance against extension of the remaining unilateral sanctions as well as hostile measures by some adverse political circles in Washington.

Strengthened public diplomacy

Public diplomacy is a process by which a government tries to influence public opinions in another, usually a rival, country in order to pave the way for the implementation of its own policies or obstruct hostile measures by the rival country’s political apparatus. Public diplomacy is the art of transforming public opinions into significant obstacles to rival countries’ political regimes and adverse policies. In recent year, particularly under Iran’s ninth and tenth administrations, this tool of foreign policy was largely neglected. It was perhaps the non-existence of a constructive link to and positive impacts on public opinions in the west that paved the way for their (il)legal measures against Iran. Now, despite domestic pressure and political costs the minister himself has had to pay, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is trying to revive public diplomacy and establish links with the west’s public opinions.

In doing so, the implementation of the JCPOA despite open opposition in the Congress, the release of $150 b of Iran’s assets (about which adverse lobbies have created intense sensitivity inside Washington’s political system), the revocation of judicial verdicts and freedom of Iranians accused of violating sanctions from US prisons, and the agreement to pay Iran $1.7 b within the framework for the settlement of an old legal dispute are among instances that the Obama administration could not achieve had it not been for Iran’s constructive communication with American public opinions.

In practice, Iran can strengthen its public diplomacy through one of the three ways outlined below.

First, sympathy on the part of political actors and factions with the foreign policy apparatus in parallel with efforts to reduce the political cost inside the country for individuals like Mr. Zarif who are in the frontline of communication with the world’s public opinions. In other words, public diplomacy should be viewed as a strategic leverage so that moves by the country’s diplomats to impress the hearts and minds of people in the world (and in particular in the United States) will not bring about political costs for them back at home.

A second way is to seize the legal opportunity and capacity in the States (particularly in Washington D.C.) and other western countries to establish supporting lobbies and organizations. Lobbies advocating Iran’s interests in Washington could act like peripheral actors in shaping public opinions and influencing the political process. To do so, the society of Iranian Americans, particularly the younger generation with its extraordinary capabilities, is a potentially important force that could be effective if Tehran starts doing more to improve its relations with the community.

A third option is to grant the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the most specialized, competent and experienced institution in public diplomacy the exclusive right to manage the area, deliver messages and establish communication with public opinions in other countries. Lack of discipline in Iran’s public communication and the existence of numerous centers that deliver messages to foreign audiences have always been manipulated by adversaries against Iran.

Beside these measures, if Iran could finalize some of the resolvable issues with United States while the Obama administration still holds office (by January 20, 2017), the next US administration will definitely have less elbow room to advance its potentially adverse intentions against Iran.

* Reza Nasri is international law expert from Geneva's Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.