Effect of the Iraq Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East

Since the American invasion in 2003, the old Iraqi political and military establishment has been dismantled and a new establishment constructed under the guidance of the United States. While command and control systems of the past used to be very centralized and authoritarian under Saddam Hussein, who used to make major decisions by himself, the political system in the new Iraq is much less centralized. The concerns of ethnic and religious groups;  the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds may well bring each power center to attempt to create “backdoors” of access of their own to the operational forces responsible for the weapons.This issue can cause security concerns for the countries in the region, particularly Iraq's neighbors.

Factors which will influence command and control of nuclear weapons in Iraq will include: the process of building the political and military establishments; the fragility of the political and military situation; and the future political orientation of Iraq (will Iraq be a liberal pro-Western or pro-Iranian state? Will it remain a unified state or disintegrate?). At this point in time, were the Iraqi leadership to have to deal with building a command and control paradigm for nuclear weapons, it would have to take into account the lack of reliability and loyalty to the regime, assume a high risk of unauthorized use by radical (Shiite or Sunni) elements inside the regime, and of penetration of foreign elements into the system to disrupt it or steal materials.

The new political system in Iraq is established on formal democratic foundations. Iraq has been defined under the new Constitution of 2005 as a democratic federal republic with a parliamentary system. The President is mainly a representative figure, while the most influential figure in decision-making in Iraqi politics is the Prime Minister, especially in matters concerning security. The Prime Minister is the head of the country's executive authority and perhaps most significantly the Commander of the Armed Forces. As the Prime Minister is also the commander of the Armed Forces, he is in charge – de jure and de facto – of defense and security affairs and he would have to take the dominant role in control of nuclear weapons. It stands to reason that this political personality will also be part of the collective decision-making in regards to nuclear weapons.

Other key elements that may have a role in the nuclear chain of command include the Minister of Interior and the Ministry of National Security Affairs, the authorities of which are still under discussion in the Parliament. This is a relatively small Ministry, in charge currently of collection of information on terrorists, fighting weapons trafficking, counter-espionage and counter- Infiltration and securing the country's vital installations. This ministry could play a role in the security of nuclear installations. Being a small body, it may be more suitable for some of the more sensitive tasks related to the nuclear weapons program. The political culture in Iraq today accords to Members of Parliament a role similar to that of Western democracies. Thus, one may expect that the procedures for command and control of nuclear weapons would be worked out in conjunction with bodies such as the parliamentary Foreign and Security Affairs Committee or an appropriate special sub-committee.

Following the American invasion of Iraq, the Iraqi army and the Republican Guard disintegrated and some of their members – Sunni Arabs for the most part - joined the insurgency, especially al-Qaeda. Since 2004, American forces have assisted the new Iraqi government in building a new Iraqi army, which has grown stronger over time. However, it is still primarily an internal security force and is not prepared to deal with foreign challenges or threats, such as what might emanate from Turkey or Iran.

The new Iraqi army is formally non-tribal and non-sectarian. However, it reflects the composition of Iraqi society: the units are ethnically and sect-wise integrated, most of the soldiers and officers are Shiites (around 60%, pretty much the same as their share in the Iraqi population), while Sunni Arabs and Kurds constitute around 20% each. Notwithstanding, the Kurds continue to maintain their separate military force – the Peshmerga, which controls the Kurdish areas in Iraq. The estimated order of battle (ORBAT) of the Peshmerga is around 200,000, i.e. as large as the Iraqi army. Until now only around 30,000 Kurdish Peshmerga members have joined the Iraqi army.

The main fear of military insubordination is linked to communal identity. In the early days of the new Iraq, problems of ethnic-based insubordination have arisen (most notably during the fighting in Falluja in 2004-2005, when Sunni-Arab Iraqi soldiers refused to fight against their Sunni-Arab brothers). Kurdish soldiers may refuse to fight their Kurdish brethren, and Shiites might refuse to fight against their Shiite brothers. These inhibitions could spill over into situations of nuclear crisis, when neighboring countries in which officers in the nuclear chain of command have religious (e.g., Shiite) sectarian, ethnic or even family links may be targeted.

Sunni and Kurdish leaders will probably demand that representatives of their communities be involved in the special units responsible for storage and securing the weapons, and in authorization procedures for launch of nuclear weapons. It also stands to reason that vetting of representatives of each community will be under control of that community – a system which could easily exacerbate the sense of insecurity regarding the ultimate loyalty of the forces in charge of the weapons. In this sense Iraq is very different from the more homogenous states on the list, like Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey, or even Syria.

Each community though may fear that in a situation which may involve nuclear escalation against a neighboring country which is ethnically/sect-wise affiliated with one of the Iraqi communities, members of that community may disobey orders. Thus, Shiite leaders may fear a Sunni “Fifth Column” in case of conflict with a Sunni country, or transfer of nuclear material to Sunni Jihadist elements, and Sunni leaders may also fear Shiite disloyalty in case of a conflict with Iran. In the future, the regime may be concerned by possible insubordination of Kurdish officers in case of a conflict with Turkey, and possible nuclear threats to neighboring Turkish Kurdistan. There may also be some concern that Kurdish elements would try to abscond with expertise, nuclear materials, and maybe nuclear weapons components, or more, in the interest of strengthening, or strategically protecting, autonomy in Kurdistan, and even for achieving Kurdish independence of a wider Kurdistan (extending from Iraq to Turkey, Iran, Syria and Armenia). These concerns may well bring each power center to attempt to create “backdoors” of access of their own to the operational forces responsible for the weapons.