Moderation, Mock Reformism and Mostafa
Q: During the Reform years, many criticized and called you a ‘mock Reformist’. Nine years afterwards, the result of Tehran City Council elections has angered some Reformists and now they are calling members of the new council mock reformists. Why do we see such anger?
A: Sentimental behavior and isolating those who don’t think like others; inter-party rivalries and exclusionist attitudes, and a tendency to grab media’s attention and say that we are the leading Reformists.
Interview with Khabaronline
Mostafa Kavakebian’s official biography starts with the headline “Familiarizing with Islamic Culture and Education since Childhood”. A conventional introduction indeed: from the available stock of adjectives to describe one’s familial background, ‘religious’ and ‘poor’, ‘modest’ or ‘average’ are most preferred by post-Revolution politicians (the term ‘middle class’ comes next, and ‘wealthy’ is hardly if ever used). The class-consciousness of early revolution years still lingers, even if the lifestyle of most politicians may hardly resemble those classless days. “The religious atmosphere of this family”, the biography continues, “made Mostafa interested in, and familiar with Islamic culture.”
“Group portrait with Mostafa”. Kavakebian’s “upbringing in a religious and blue-collar family”, the biography claims, urged him to join the revolution. In the picture the young man, dressed in the popular sport blazer of those years, is looking confidently and triumphantly into the camera, marching in the front line of a crowed carrying placards of Ayatollah Khomeini. Soon after the revolution, he founded his revolutionary group “al-Khomeiniyoon”- the Khomeinists. For the typical Iranian today, the name of the group may sound awkwardly Arabic, but in the context of those years, it was an apt choice, similar in form to the title of Arab revolutionary and guerilla groups, active in Palestine and Lebanon.
The photo shows Mostafa, gradually growing beards, at the centerpiece, next to eminent revolutionary Mohammad Hussein Beheshti. Fellow young men, most wearing beards, others still sticking to moustaches, have surrounded the ayatollah. Mostafa is standing next to him, stretching his neck to appear in the picture. Moustaches have been fully replaced by beards in the next picture, where young revolutionaries have seen on the ground, listening to Ayatollah Khamenei, the next leader of the revolution. Mostafa is sitting exactly beside him.
The biography continues that Kavakebian has “frequently” and “voluntarily” attended the war front in the 8-year imposed by Saddam Hussein on Iran, in order to “conserve the independence of the country and the Revolution’s achievements.” We see him in the nondescript khaki uniform of voluntary forces in different poses, smiling, praying and heeding clerical advice. The biography informs us that he has been wounded in action; “an honor achieved to conserve the achievements of the Islamic system.” The tone of text follows revolutionary conventions.
The next cleric Mostafa is sitting beside is Mahdavi Kani, a key center for educating post-Revolution bureaucrats, future godfather of the conservative front, and head of the Imam Sadegh University, where Mostafa started his academic studies. This is not his only contact with clerics. The biography reminds us that he has also passed seminary courses in Tehran, and his PhD was completed under the supervision of Ayatollah Amid Zanjani, a senior politician-cleric.
The biography then moves to in-war and post-war years, when Kavakebian found a place inside the middle-ranks of the new bureaucratic system. Beards are gradually becoming shorter and trimmed, though sartorial style does not seem to be the strong suit of the new bureaucrats.
Meeting foreign diplomats, Kavakebian is wearing lilac pants with an unbecoming textured tan blazer and patterned vest. Three buttoned Henley collar has already established its position on top of Iranian diplomats’ shirts, particularly diplomats. Khatami, in the center of the picture is different. ‘The man with chocolate robe’ is and will always be a fashion-savvy cleric. Other pictures leave the same impression about Mustafa’s clothing taste, though his picture with the future president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proves that Kavakebian is no exception in this matter. From mid-80s to early 90s, Kavakebian’s positions and his visits to other countries -the biography takes pain to count all of them- provide him an opportunity to acquire “adequate familiarity with bureaucratic and executive affairs of the country” we are reminded.
Conducting research and “authoring scholarly findings in political, social and cultural fields” is a prominent feature of Doctor Kavakebian we understand through the biography. With a doctorate in political science from Imam Sadegh, where both conservative and reformist politicians have graduated from, the title of his books should not be surprising: “Correlation between Religion and Politics in View of Imam Khomeini”, “Imam Khomeini and the Revival of Religious Thinking”, “The Battle between Rich and Poor in View of Imam Khomeini” and “Seven Drops from the Flowing Limpid [River] of Imam Khomeini’s Thoughts”. But the Reform era seems to have left its imprint on the title of his papers: “The Impact of Popular Vote in Nahj-ul-Balaghah” and “Human Rights in Viewpoint of Islam”.
“Sovereignty Belongs to People”: a radical motto in the Islamic Republic context indeed. One may ask if Mostafa and his fellow founders of the Mardomsalari (Democracy) party were aware of the historical background of the phrase and its implications. The party, established in 2002, claims to be a genuine grassroots party since unlike most other Iranian parties no senior official has been its founder. This may be true of course: unlike parties such as E’temaade Melli (which Mehdi Karroubi founded in 2005 after failing in presidential elections) or Jebhe-ye Mosharekat (founded by pro-Khatami MPs and members of his cabinet), no senior figure has ever been a member of the party. Splitting hair, however, one might find it difficult to call Mardomsalari a grassroots party, since it would be hard to identify its social and economic base. In this aspect, it follows the same pattern as other parties in Iran: a group of senior or middle rank politicians loosely bound by short-lived common interests, who may at some point, defy their party’s position and join a different group. “The party has relied on the noble and loyal-to-Islamic-Revolution-causes people and Reformist principles” and -in this part echoing the ethos of the Reformist era- “has attempted to build a polyvocal, lively and vibrant society.” We see Kavakebian in his meeting with senior religious figure Nasser Makarem Shirazi, seated in seiza as a sign of utter respect.
The top picture shows Mostafa with short beards, standing by Khatami -in the president’s visit to Kavakebian’s hometown of Semnan perhaps? The beard will turn into a goatee in a few years. This type of facial hair, for long absent from post-Revolution political fashion front, is a third way in its own right: between non-Islamic, taghouti clean shaven faces and full revolutionary-religious beards.
This was not the only third way that Mostafa chose: in the wake of 2009 political turmoil in Iran, after reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to presidency and the purging of vocal reformists from the scene, the “most active member of the eighth parliament” -according to his official website- seized the moment to transform his marginal position in the reformist camp. For this, Mostafa adopted his own dual-track strategy: while participating in debates versus Principlists, he distanced himself from the post-election protests and advocated the ‘pre-election infraction’ narrative vis-à-vis ‘electoral fraud’ narrative. Against the boycott campaign run by Green Movement supporters, Kavakebian ran for the ninth parliamentary election from his hometown Semnan, though he failed to retain his seat losing to his Principlist rival with a 4 thousand vote margin. One year later, Kavakebian, decorated with the “mock Reformist” medal by angry dissidents, stepped in for the presidential election while heated pro-boycott and pro-participation debates were still going on among Reformist grassroots. Like many other presidential aspirants, Kavakebian was disqualified from the competition by the Guardian Council without any further explanation and had to shelve his campaign of ‘Moralistic Government’ (probably a reaction to perceived unethical practices of Ahmadinejad’s administration). As Rouhani’s electoral campaign gained momentum, Kavakebian also announced his support for the purple candidate.
Rouhani’s election has changed the gloomy prospect of post-2009 for Reformists and brought them tentative hope for return to politics. Kavakebian and company are now planning for the Tenth Parliamentary election, intending to take way from Principlists the majority they have enjoyed for three consecutive terms in the forced leave of absence taken by leading Reformist figures. The top headline on Kavakebian’s official website is a quote from his interview with Khabaronline: “Reformists will definitely win the majority of the Tenth Parliament if they’re united.” He seems happy for the moment, but would Principlists want to see him and other Reformists happier?
By: Ali Attaran