Strategic Turn or Tactical Flexibility
Europe’s relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran have experienced numerous ups and downs so much so that, during different periods of time and under the shadow of different dialogues, Iran’s relations with Europe have sometimes been close and have sometimes turned sour. With the coming to power of the 11th administration and the emergence of the dialogue of moderation in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there seem to be signs of improvement in Iran-Europe relations. The visits made by the parliamentary delegations of the European Union, Italy and Britain to Iran and the unofficial proposal of the opening of an EU office in Tehran are among the positive signs in this regard.
Historical events and experiences indicate the fact that relations between Iran and Europe continue within the framework of a strategic triangle rather than being linear. Therefore, Iran-Europe relations cannot be analyzed bilaterally; the strategic US factor must also be considered, because the US acts as a mediating variable and as a powerful intermediary in the interactions between Iran and Europe. This dependency reaches the extent that if we do not say that the relations between Iran and Europe are a variable of the interactions between Europe and the US, we could at least say that they are strongly affected by it. On this basis, the important question is, is Europe’s policy of moving closer to Tehran a strategic turn in the EU’s foreign policy with regard to Iran or a tactical flexibility under the shadow of the developments made in Iran-US relations? Three viewpoints should be pointed out in response to this question.
The first viewpoint believes that the EU, as an international and independent player, intends to expand its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran under the shadow of domestic developments and the interactive approach of Iran’s foreign policy. The reason, based on the belief of supporters of this viewpoint, is that Europe and the US have different and even contradictory strategic interests in the international scene which they independently pursue; relations between Europe and the US are not an exception to this rule. Thus, Europe’s interests in expanding its relations with Iran do not necessarily depend on the US’ interests. Furthermore, Europe and the US might even pursue contradictory interests in their relations with Iran. Therefore, relations between Iran and Europe must be assessed independently from the US view towards the Islamic Republic.
On the contrary, the second viewpoint believes that the EU attempts to expand its relations with Iran in order to follow the US. On this basis, Europe and the US pursue common objectives and interests; so much so that the interests of Europe depend and are defined by US interests. Therefore, Europe’s attempts to expand its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran are made with the US’ green light and in order to safeguard the strategic interests of this country which also include the interests of the European Union. Thus one must not have too much hope for an improvement in Europe’s relations with Iran independently from the expansion of relations between the US and Iran.
The third viewpoint opposes the two previous ones and states that Europe’s policy to expand its relations with Iran is based on its interest in gaining more freedom of action than the US in the world and the Middle East, because Europe is neither an absolute follower of the US nor an independent international player which confronts the US. Europe and the US have common values, objectives and strategic interests and, based on a strategic alliance, they attempt to provide these interests. Their common values, objectives and strategic interests are completely similar with regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran. But this strategic alliance does not mean that Europe and the US do not have different tactical objectives and interests regarding Iran. The reason is that while Europe and the US pursue common strategic interests, their methods of safeguarding these interests might be different. Furthermore, within the framework of strategies and strategic interests, there is a competition between them to provide unilateral tactical interests.
The precedence and experience of the US-Europe interactions at the international and regional level and with regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran proves the third viewpoint. The history of international relations following WWII shows that Europe and the US act based on their common objectives, values and strategic interests with regard to other rivals and players. Europe’s relations with the Soviet Union are a proof of this idea. But during the Cold War, the European countries had different opinions and a tactical competition within the framework of their common strategic interests in the expansion of relations with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Europeans considered and defined the strategic structure of the West to have two columns, one of which was a united Europe. This two-column structure needed more freedom of action for Europe in the international system and interaction with the Soviet Union and other international players. This European view of the structure of the strategic interaction between the US and Europe still exists.
The logic of Europe’s freedom of action from the US guarantees several strategic results. First, following the chaotic political and security excitements caused by September 11th and the failure of the US’ unilateral policy and the experiences of regional crises, Europe intends to strengthen the European column and gain more freedom of action to play a more active role in the Middle East. Secondly, the US and Europe have reached a common assessment and strategic agreement in their interaction with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Europe’s closeness to Iran does not mean confrontation with the US. Third, Europe attempts to achieve desirable and balanced interests in comparison to the US within the framework of the strategy of the West’s interaction with Iran. Following the disclosure of secret negotiations between Iran and the US before the Iran-P5+1 nuclear agreement, European countries look to provide further interests for Europe. Fourthly, political and human rights issues will be more strongly highlighted in relations between Iran and Europe, for values and norms play a bigger role in Europe’s foreign policy than in US foreign policy. Fifth, in Europe’s relations with Iran, economic and political issues are indispensably linked. The history of Europe’s relations with Iran following the Islamic Revolution indicates that political issues cannot be separated from economic issues based on the logic of practicality. Therefore, Europe’s economic relations with Iran are strongly influenced by its political relations. Sixth, based on the diplomacy of elimination, the Islamic Republic of Iran could better use tactical competitions between Europe and the US in order to advance its national objectives and interests. This issue can be used more in the economic fields. Seventh, Europe has always intended to play a more active role in the Middle East. This issue has been intensified after the crises in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Egypt. Iran, as a regional power, can help Europe to play a more positive role in this region. Eighth, although Europe’s relations with Iran are not totally dependent on the US, they cannot be expanded at the level of an independent strategy either. The experience of Iran’s nuclear negotiations with the three European countries proves this fact. Ninth, the cold relations between Saudi Arabia and the US, Saudi Arabia’s closeness to Israel and Europe’s motivation to have a more active presence in the Middle East highlight the role of the Arab element in relations between Europe and Iran. This reaches the point that Saudi Arabia acts as a destructive element in the expansion of Iran-Europe relations. Tenth, the expansion and improvement of relations between Iran and Europe are dependent on the nuclear negotiations with the P5+1. Any success, failure and deadlock in these negotiations will directly affect the relations between Iran and Europe.