From the Algerian Coup to the Egyptian Coup

There have been numerous analyses with regard to the crisis in Egypt and the coup which was carried out in this country. These assessments can be divided into two groups. One group are the assessments which relate the expansion of the Egyptian crisis and the military coup to only one element and consider the mistakes and inefficiencies of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood as the sole and main causes of the military’s domination over Egypt’s destiny. But the other group present many reasons for the growth of tensions and the coup; they mention the shortcomings and mistakes of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood as one of the reasons behind this incident and discuss other major causes of these events.

Those analyses which consider the expansion of the crisis and the military coup to be only due to one element are mainly in line with the positions of the West (and even the position of the Zionist regime). This group considers Morsi himself and the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party, which is the political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, as the main causes of the present conditions in Egypt; Based on their assessment, the severe growth of public dissatisfaction in Egypt has been caused by the inefficiency of Morsi’s government and non-fulfillment of his promises. Furthermore, Morsi and his friends in the Muslim Brotherhood have made big mistakes in pursuing political strategies in the domestic and foreign scenes.

This group accuses Morsi and other Muslim Brotherhood leaders of partisanship in Egypt’s political and administrative structure and condemns their unforgiveable inclination towards the Takfiri and Salafi groups. According to this evaluation, these issues were the only cause of the people’s protests and their demand for Morsi’s removal from power. This group then talks about Egypt’s dangerous position on the cliff of violence and believe that this is the same situation which led the Egyptian army to enter the scene and launch a coup, not based on a pre-planned program but due to the necessity of the situation.

But as it was mentioned earlier, the second group considers the impacts and effects of a collection of causes in the creation of the new conditions and the coup in Egypt. Even in some cases, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s mistakes and inefficiencies are considered as small incidents compared to other causes. These analyses (which are mainly not influenced by the western and Zionist media) consider the entrance of the military into Egypt’s political scene as a positive step only if it is directed towards the protection of the legitimate and elected government and safeguarding the adopted constitution; they do not agree with the way that it happened which led to the downfall of Morsi’s legitimate government and the abolition of the constitution. These assessments reiterate that: it is true that Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were not successful in administering the country and were not able to respond to people’s demands and fulfill their promises during the past year, but this important point must be considered that in today’s world, one year is not enough in order to solve the economic problems. On the other hand, during this time, the president himself, besides holding the highest executive responsibilities, had the task of continuing the revolution and confronting the remnants of the former totalitarian regime of Egypt. The reason is that the revolution in Egypt was not complete when it entered the political scene of administering the country, and the officials of the previous regime were in charge of holding the first parliamentary and presidential elections, following the removal of Hosni Mubarak. The same military personnel who, during the transitional period, were not willing to hand over power to the government which was elected by the people and, many times, had shown signs of their ambitions to return to power.

Other causes are mentioned in the second group of assessments as the main reasons behind the coup. One of them is the performance of the collection of small secular, liberal, nationalist, left and even Takfiri parties in dealing with Morsi’s legitimate government and aimed at paralyzing the executive affairs and demanding shares in power (more than they deserved, based on their social status).

These evaluations mention the strategy of these parties and their attempts to create an obstacle in front of Morsi and to raise people’s expectations; in particular, from their point of view, Morsi’s opposing parties always resorted to street protests instead of the elective process. Furthermore, at the same time as the 31 invitations extended by Morsi for direct negotiations, they held 27 street demonstrations during the one year of Morsi’s presidency, the biggest of which was the one which was held on Sunday. Other significant points which are mentioned in the second group of analyses are related to previous warnings based on the repetition of the experience of the military coup in Algeria, wherein about 300,000 people in this country were killed in 1992, being accused of participating in an election which led to the victory of the Islamists. Now with the arrest of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and the heavy accusations made against them, such horrific warning signs can be seen in the moves of the Egyptian military.

Finally, another important point is the role played by the reactionary leaders of the region in Egypt’s incidents. The congratulatory message of the Saudi King to those who launched the coup in Egypt can reveal many other secret causes behind the Egyptian coup which have been ignored by the western analysts.