Arab Developments and Iran’s Regional Policy

Arab developments have impacted Iran’s regional policies. Under the new circumstances, the main objective of Iran’s policy is to create balance between the expansion of “cooperation” with governments based on the establishment of a regional coalition on one hand, and the “containment” of threats on the basis of maintaining the resistance movement, on the other. These developments will strengthen “pragmatism” in Iran’s regional policy.

Prior to the Arab developments, Iran had only been able to enhance its influence in the region by establishing relations with peoples and the Islamic movements. Of course, the formation of a Shiite government in Iraq and the establishment of close relations with Iran was a turning point. But following these developments and the emergence of nationalist-Islamic governments as we have seen in Egypt, which seek a return to an independent and active role in regional affairs, an opportunity was created for Iran to simultaneously establish relations with the Arab countries as well.

On one hand, Iran pursues an expansion of relations with the new governments in order to strengthen regional cooperation to be able to solve regional issues such as the crisis in Syria. On the other hand, a new rivalry emerged between Iran and other regional players, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia and sometimes Egypt, to safeguard the geopolitical and ideological interests of these governments at the regional level.

Iran’s reaction to these developments was to make efforts to become compatible with the new conditions by relying on a “regionalist” approach in order to safeguard the geopolitical and ideological interests of Iran at the same time. This approach can be considered as an attempt to increase Iran’s regional role through cooperation with the new governments, including Egypt, to provide geopolitical interests, on one hand, and strengthen the resistance movement with the aim of containing threats through maintaining relations with Hezbollah and Hamas in order to provide ideological interests, on the other.

Traditionally, the direction of Iran’s regional policy was based on reliance on the “compromise” and “resistance” blocs. The “compromise” bloc consisted of the US and its regional allies, including Egypt (during the Mubarak era), Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Iran and its allies, including Syria, Iraq, Hezbollah, and Hamas, formed the “resistance” block. Iran was at the head of the ideological resistance movements of the region; but following the Arab developments, issues such as Iran’s relations with governments including the government of Egypt, management of the Syrian crisis, and maintaining the resistance movement gained importance in Iran’s regional policies.

In defining the two “compromise” and “resistance” blocks, which is basically a western idea, Iran’s time and energy is consumed in order to struggle against the “compromise” block, i.e. the US and its regional allies. This game was a win-lose situation for Iran and, from a policy-making perspective, is related to the concept of containment and deterrence. This calculated approach considers Iran as the main source of threats in the region and allows Iran’s competitors and enemies to justify their policy of confronting Iran.

On the opposite side, the approach of the regional coalition based on the expansion of regional cooperation between the main regional players (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) to solve regional issues is pursued. This is a win-win game and will lead to “cooperation” with regional players. This approach will isolate Iran’s competitors and enemies and make them recognize the legitimacy of Iran’s regional role through other regional players, especially Egypt, Turkey and, perhaps in the future, Saudi Arabia.

Iran’s support of the Kofi Annan plan to solve the Syrian crisis, support of Lakhdar Brahimi’s (the UN special envoy in Syria) activities in Syria, and ultimately its participation in Morsi’s plan for quadrilateral cooperation between Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, were all within the framework of strengthening regional cooperation. This approach is closer to the views of Russia and China, and even the EU.

In a regionalist approach, the interests of regional and foreign players in regional issues are simultaneously considered. Here, the interests are not defined as the interests of the big powers (especially the US) as was in the past, but rather the interests of all players, by prioritizing the political and security realities of the region.   

But the US-Israeli view basically opposes the formation of regional cooperation. Based on a dominant western outlook, the US is the only player which can and should find the final solution for the crises in the Middle East. Recently, Condoleezza Rice, the former US Secretary of State, in an article published in the Washington Post, emphasized that the US must not allow regional powers (particularly Iran) to solve the crisis in Syria, since their interests, by nature, are not compatible with US interests. In her opinion, the US, as an extra-regional power, must enter the scene and finish the job.

Based on miscalculations, the US finds its interests in creating a rift between the regional powers and in containing them by using one against the other; but the US has forgotten that this approach, as it became clear in the crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, will further complicate regional issues. Following the Arab developments, reliance on the concept of “containment” in Iran’s relations with regional countries including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt has lost its efficiency and also damages peace and security in the region.

Under these conditions, changing the direction of Iran’s regional policy toward strengthening a regional coalition will enhance Iran’s regional role and, at the same time, maintain Iran’s relations with ideological forces which have been strengthened by the emergence of the new Islamist movement in the region. This policy will encourage regional and foreign players to accept Iran’s new role.