The Vague Future of Pakistan

Parliamentary elections on 18^th of February in Pakistan were one of the most important developments for this South Asian country, with major influences on the region and the world. Apparently, this was an election to gain seats in the parliament, but most of the political analysts agree that the winning party will control the government, thus the dominant power in the political scene.

 

The United States government was the main supporter of election, because of its planned long-term presence in Afghanistan and NATO’s role in this country, and due to the effect of Pakistan’s political developments on Afghanistan.

 

The American strategists believe that the only way to control a military government, widespread misrule, connections between the Pakistani army and Afghan insurgents, the Pakistani Taliban and the unresting society of Pakistan that struggles for its rights and legitimate freedoms, is an engineered election.

 

Almost everybody knows that Musharraf’s holding election in this way –with the participation of his exiled opponents- was in fact under U.S. pressures. After authoritatively dismissing Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry –the only person who stood against Musharraf for holding presidential elections- that cemented his position, Musharraf consented to put away his military uniform only when the security of his political situation had been guaranteed.

 

Benazir Bhutto’s assassination spoiled nearly all those plans that were aimed to fulfill United States’ goals in the region -besides social and political development of Pakistan.

 

However, the predictable defeat of pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) against the PPP and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and the accusations by both winning parties against Musharraf on his complicity in assassinating Bhutto or at least irresponsibility in maintaining her security, have left little chances for the president to save his post.

 

The result of several rounds of negotiations between winning parties of the election, has brought hard days for Musharraf and if the Pakistani army led by Ashfaq Pervez Kiani doesn’t imitate its Turkish counterpart, the president’s bloodless fall will be the most probable result of recent developments.

 

Everybody knows that Pakistan is trapped in so deep problems that can be removed only by long-term policies. These policies have to free Pakistan from this vicious cycle, military rule and social privations; they must fulfill the primary needs of the Pakistani society and prepare grounds for maximum participation of people.

 

Like most of the inhabitants of this region, Pakistanis are Muslims. Culturally and socially they are underdeveloped and economically they are in need of foreign aids. Politically, Pakistanis are moderate and opposed to social violence. The general, traditional attitude of people naturally brings forward solutions based on public culture.

 

However, during 30 years after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Pakistan has moved in various courses because of its economic needs or external pressures. The results of these contradictory policies have been rise of actors that have formed political groups independent from government and heedless of international conventions-. These groups have plans different from what "outsiders" demand.

 

Even ISI –Pakistan’s intelligence service- and the army that paved the way for formation of such groups have now become a target for the Jihadists. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were formed by Saudi Arabia’s financial support to firstly put Iran under pressure and secondly intimidate Shiites in Pakistan.

 

Both of these groups have now moved themselves away from the Pakistani government and Saudi Arabia’s funds and have gained public base besides a widespread network of mosques to defy the current governmental policies. Similarly, Taliban was formed with planning and support of the United States and in order to battle against Soviet Union’s occupation in Afghanistan. But this group has become the most troubling challenge for U.S., Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

 

Taliban’s suicide attacks target institutions and groups that were once their supporters. Most important of all, their increasing power has brought a nightmare for West: Will they take control over Pakistan one day?

 

Although religious groups’ success in elections has never passed 14% of the votes, but due to the endless corruption of the elite, American officials fear that Pakistan’s traditional society turns its face towards religious groups as the best option for ruling Pakistan that will lead to another Islamic Revolution in the region.

 

After a 20 billion dollar aid to Pakistan (since 9/11), the United States follows the "War on Terror" policy which has not been a matter of interest for Pakistanis so far. But the elite and educated upper class acknowledges its importance and addresses the issue in its political contest. Naturally the cultural, economic gap between upper class and lower class does not give way to stability for this country.

 

Islamists are the most important marginal political group of Pakistan, under heavy pressure of propaganda machine because of their replete-with-violence background. Although there is no chance in short-term for these groups to hold the power, but they are the most important international and regional problem for the United States and Pakistan. For many in Washington who seek a trustworthy ally, what these groups cause in nothing other than instability, distrust and frustration. In fact, although American politicians believe that "War on Terror" has two military and social aspects, social aids and education programs have led to resistance against any interferential policies and military measures. The surprising point about the recent election is the two contradictory phenomena Pakistanis experience simultaneously: political contest and war.

 

The Tribal Areas –between Afghanistan and Pakistan- are a vast, unruly region that up to now have been governed under a traditional tribal system and without any external intervention. Because of the support it showed for Bin Laden and Taliban, this primitive, underdeveloped area has become the most important region for Western strategists.

 

When in 2004 Musharraf dispatched 80 thousand Pakistani troops to this region despite his own will, he never thought of a casualty of thousands of military men and a shattered image for his army.

 

In past the tribes had been financially dependent on the government and they feared army’s interference. But after formation of groups that had relations with al-Qaeda, not only the tribes were set free from financial dependence, but the younger generation became bold enough to confront the government.

 

This has led the American analysts to this result that chances of Bin Laden hiding in this region are very high. So far the United States has spent 750 million dollars for social development in this region and another 350 million for heads of the tribes to stop aiding the insurgents.

 

As it was mentioned, currently there is a little possibility that Islamist parties of Pakistan hold a decisive victory, but because of social chaos and intermittent foreign interference, these groups have the potential to suddenly take control of the country.

 

The crucial question for the United States is that who will hold control of the atomic power in Pakistan? Can Pakistani scientist be isolated from society, uninfluenced by all the recent political developments? Is west rightful to fear that social-military groups may possess radioactive materials?