Qatar, the Difference between Assad and Saleh
On Saturday, 12th of November 2010, the Arab League suspended Syria’s membership in the end of a two-week deadline for Bashar Assad to end the violent crackdown on his people. The organization also called for Arab countries to recall their ambassadors from Damascus. Eighteen out of 22 member countries of the Arab League approved this decision. Lebanon and Yemen voted against it and Iraq cast an abstention vote. The Qatari Prime Minster Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani, the mastermind behind the Arab League’s decision, stated that the organization would impose economic and political sanctions against Bashar Assad’s regime. Regardless of whether Syria deserved this tough reaction or not, AL’s feisty reaction poses the question that who keeps the organization up and running in the current messy situation of the Middle East. Egypt, the seat of the league, always playing a leading role in the organization is in transition and power has not been yet transferred by the Egyptian army to the revolutionaries. So who really manages the Arab League these days?
The second question is why the AL does not devise any plan or issue any ultimatum against countries facing a similar situation crisis, such as Yemen and Bahrain. From the outset, the Bahraini people’s destiny was clear: they are mostly Shi’a and regarding the sectarian disposition dominant among the Arabs, Bahrain’s case becomes different from any other country. But why does not the Arab League do anything about Yemen in which not only the protests are at their peak, but also Ali Abdullah Saleh acts in a similar manner to the Syrian Baath Party?
To answer these questions, one should first review the positions adopted by the Arab actors in facing the Arab Spring. Following the 2011 developments, there has been a demarcation among the Arab world actors: there are reformist actors that support the revolutions and there are conservative actors that support the previous order governing the region. Saudi Arabia stands at the top of the second group, namely those supporting the previous state of affairs and not defending any changes in any Arab country except Syria. Riyadh did not even take any decisive measure regarding Libya, although the Saudi princes detested Qaddafi. The actors of the first group, although popular among the Arab street, are not officially supported in the international community in their efforts except by the countries other than the three in which revolutions have taken place. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the power in not transferred completely to the pro-democracy forces and a great vacuum still exists.
Qatar is an exception within this equation. Having a traditional non-democratic system should naturally place them inside the second group, i.e. the conservative powers. Nonetheless the diplomatic finesse of Doha orders them to take advantage of the gaps and use the existing capacities. Take a look at the regional changes, it is evident that Qatar desires to act as the leader of the reform movements, defending all sort of changes in the Arab world. Their status came into spotlight in Libya’s case, when their military forces joined the international coalition taking action against Qaddafi’s forces. Rached al-Ghannouchi, the leader of Islamist Ennahda party that secured 91 seats in the Tunisian Constituent Assembly, paid his first foreign visit to Doha, inviting the Qatari Emir to participate in the opening ceremony of the assembly. While in Libya and Tunisia, there are some objections against Doha’s burgeoning role, they are not adequately strong to curb the smart active diplomacy of Qatar which knows no red line.
The Arab League has made two important decisions during the recent months: first, inviting the international community to support the Libyan people and to participate in the military operation; and second, the decision to suspend Syria’s membership in the organization. In both cases, Qatar played a decisive role and the Qatari Prime Minister chaired the two sessions leading to the punitive decisions through backstage lobbies. In an interview with Egyptian al-Akhbar Daily, Hamad bin Jassem tried taken on the guise of a revolutionary leader, not only scolding the rulers for their exerting violence against the opponents, but also warning that the Persian Gulf sheikhs are not thoroughly immune to the changes!
The difference between the Arabs’ reaction against Assad and Saleh should be traced back to the differences between the diplomacy of Qatar and Saudi Arabia: In Yemen, Arabs mediate via Saudis and the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council. Saudi Arabia’s power transition plan for Yemen has not changed although Saleh has refrained from signing the proposal at the last moments four times. As other instances of their sluggish diplomacy, the Saudis still insist on the 1989 Taif Treaty as a frame of reference for regulating political complications in Lebanon and King Abdullah’s 2002 scheme for the Middle East peace process is still on the table, despite deep changes brought to the circumstances.
No one should expect the Saudis change their royal ideas about Yemen’s power transition initiative. Even if Saleh relinquishes power, Riyadh rhetoric on the Yemeni affair won’t change. As another problem, when Saudi Arabia fixate on a crisis, no international power is inclined to challenge their policy. Trillion-dollar foreign exchange reserves, 12 million barrel per day oil production potential and 300 billion barrels of oil reserves belonging the princes of desert are more important for the pragmatist leaders of the international community than the demands of the impoverished Yemenis or calls for democracy in Bahrain. Even the Security Council’s decision on the Yemeni crisis –culminating in the unanimously approved 2014 resolution- did not go beyond the Saudis’ plan, since no country wanted to hurt feelings in Riyadh, as some diplomats have confessed.
In Syria, contrary to Yemen, Qatar is the most active country of the Arab World. The ministerial meetings of the Arab League on Syria held with chairmanship of the Qatari prime minister Hamd Bin Jassim and the Syrian FM Walid Muallem actually received the League’s offer from Qataris in Doha. Qatar’s active diplomacy is contrary to the snail-paced, inept diplomacy of Saudis. In the first days of Yemen’s crisis, with the Security Council and Saudi Arabia taking control of the situation, Qatar left the Yemen’s case to Saudi Arabia, as it felt that nothing can be done as long as the Saudis are making decisions.
Beside other challenges, Bashar is unlikely that Doha has take helm of Arab diplomacy at this point of time. Qatar, the adventurous country that provided an Arab legitimacy to fight against Qaddafi, is now trying to ostracize Damascus through suspending the Syria’s membership in the Arab League. and as the voice of pro-democracy Arab states, promises more punishments for the Syrian government.