A Year of Nuclear Diplomacy

During the year, four major developments concerning Iran’s nuclear dossier took place on regional and international levels, each somehow managing to catch the eye of the international community. The first development was the Tehran Declaration, which was signed by the foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey and Brazil on May 17, 2010. According to this declaration, Iran was to exchange 1,200 kg of its low-enriched uranium (5.3) with 120 kg of 20 percent-enriched nuclear fuel for the Tehran reactor.

The attendance of the presidents of Turkey and Brazil in Tehran, and the final agreement achieved among these three countries, was considered a great victory for Iran at the international level. It was in that context that not only Iran but also the West considered Iran’s move, a move aiming at splitting the UN Security Council vote. Iran’s initiative in reaching an agreement with two temporary members of the Council was very courageous and was a political plan by Iran which put its opponents in a passive stance. But a question- which Iran had no good response to- was why Iran agreed to this conference when it had objected to it just a few months back, and whether Iran’s initiative had any other objective other than to forestall new sanctions. The West focused on this issue, and identified the Tehran Declaration as not an act of honesty, rather an emergency measure taken to avoid new sanctions.  

Making the necessary concessions to China and Russia for their cooperation with the three Western permanent members of this Council enabled the US and its allies to announce that the three permanent members were in agreement with new sanctions. On the other hand, Turkey’s and Brazil’s efforts in persuading the West to benefit from the Tehran Declaration and delay the sanctions had no result, although these two countries had announced that they had followed up the issue and came to agreements with Iran because of US interest in revitalizing the issue of an uranium exchange.

The second important development took place with regards this situation when another sanction resolution was passed in the Security Council on June 9, 2010. Even though Turkey and Brazil voted against the sanctions, the West was able to brush aside Iran’s initiative in exchanging enriched uranium, and again choose antagonism as their first priority in dealing with Iran.

Resolution 1929 increased pressures on Iran from two perspectives. First, new sanctions were passed against Iran, and second, they paved the way for the possibility of other bilateral sanctions to be imposed on Iran by the US, the European Union, and other Western countries. The 1929 sanctions, along with these bilateral sanctions, caused problems in Iran’s economic activities, and to sum up, they increased the cost of Iran’s foreign trade. On the other hand, the passage of the resolution- while Iran had announced that it was ready to trade its biggest winning card, namely enriched uranium from inside the country- was a huge blow to interactions between the two sides.

Turkey and Brazil’s negative vote provided Iran with a temporary propaganda tool indicating that the international community was not integrated in dealing with its nuclear issue, and that this resolution had passed because of pressures imposed (and enticements) by the US and its allies on members of the Council. But the truth revealed itself some days after both sides had finished their propaganda against each other; Turkey’s and Brazil’s disagreement was forgotten and the new 1929 sanction resolution was added to other binding sanctions against Iran. Perhaps Iran’s mistake was that it thought the disagreement of Turkey and Brazil was strong enough to create a big split in the Security Council vote. However, it was always the permanent members of the Council who had a decisive role in decision-making, and the reason for that is their right of veto.

The passage of Resolution 1929 created some conflict in Iran’s relations with the 5+1 group for some months. Talk of further negotiations was no more on the agenda when the West rejected Iran’s initiative and was not willing to actually consider the Tehran Declaration. Instead, bilateral sanctions were approved and later, in line with their carrot and stick policy, Western countries proposed to have further negotiations with Iran.

The third important event with regard the nuclear issue took place on December 6, 2010, when negotiations were resumed,14 months after the Geneva talks. Cold relations on both sides were such that no one expected any significant progress in the process of negotiations. This expectation was met: and after two days of negotiations, both parties only agreed to gather again in Istanbul to resume talks. Suspicion between the parties was so intense that even their understanding of the Istanbul agenda differed. While Iran had announced the Istanbul agenda would focus on issues agreed upon before, the foreign minister of the EU, Catherine Ashton, announced that the most important subject in the Istanbul summit would be Iran’s nuclear issue.

One and a half months after talks in Geneva, the Istanbul summit was held on January 20, 2011- it became the fourth important development in Iran’s nuclear issue. Turkey’s interest in making progress in negotiations and its hosting of this summit created the expectation that negotiations this time would actually have a result. Although the issue of fuel exchange and the possibility of progress on this issue had attracted the attention of observers and the international media, it didn’t take long before it was obvious that this round of negotiations would have the same fate as other ones. The Istanbul summit also ended without reaching any conclusion, and although both sides agreed to continue negotiations, no specific date was set for the next round of talks.

Overall, the year 1389 AH was not a successful year in Iran’s foreign policy regarding its nuclear issue. The passage of Resolution 1929 and other bilateral sanctions by the West created such a strained political and economic atmosphere in the country that reaching agreements became a difficult task. Iran expected that the West would welcome the Tehran Declaration and hold off on the passage of new sanctions. Western countries, however, wanted to have the upper hand in the negotiations and they considered the Tehran Declaration a new trick by Iran to postpone the passage of new sanctions. Therefore, irrespective of the Declaration, they continued their policy of confrontation with all their might.

Perhaps the most important fact that prevented any progress in the nuclear negotiations in 1390 AH, was the deduction made by both sides that they could gain a better stance in the negotiations with the passage of time. The West assumed that by intensifying and continuing sanctions on Iran, they would eventually force the country to compromise. Iran, on the other hand, thought that it could withstand pressures from the West and get around the sanctions through creating a split in the Security Council.

Until both parties come to the conclusion that the only solution to Iran’s nuclear issue is interaction, the current dilemma will continue. The West has to accept that it is negotiating with a country that has achieved significant and irreversible progress in nuclear issues. Beside that, Iran is entitled, as a member of the NPT, to fully benefit from its rights, and the possibility of reversing Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is out of the question.  On the other hand, Iran has to be responsive to the legitimate demands of the international community through its interaction with it. If both parties exercise their political will, reaching an understanding should not be impossible. The recent developments in the Middle East and the awakening of democracy and freedom, and the confrontation of tyrants in these countries, has increased the necessity of reaching an understanding with Iran on its nuclear issue. The West believes that the situation in the Middle East is so fluid that any change in the region could only create a more ambiguous future. Therefore, it is willing to resume talks with Iran. Iran should take advantage of this situation, and gain the necessary points to move the negotiations forward in accordance with its nuclear policy stance to reach a conclusion. Paying excessive attention to the need in the West to negotiate with Iran should not lead to a loss of opportunity in the situation. Otherwise, everyone will be a loser in this equation.